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Abstract
Most of the literature on stability of International Environmental Agreements is essen-
tially static and can therefore not identify changes in the size of the stable coalition in
connection with changes in the stock of pollutants. This is a relevant issue because most
global pollution problems are dynamic with stock externalities. This paper shows that the
incentives for membership indeed change with changes in the stock of pollutants and that
technology choice is an important factor when considering the consequences.
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11 Introduction
The literature on stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) usually em-
ploys static models and identiﬁes a ﬁxed size for the stable coalition (see Barrett (2003)
and Finus (2003) for good surveys). However, many of the underlying environmental prob-
lems (such as climate change) involve stock externalities and are based on dynamic ac-
cumulation of pollution. The question rises whether the size of the stable coalition may
change with changes in the stock of pollutants and, if yes, what the consequences are.
This paper formulates a standard international pollution control model and follows the
main part of the literature by using a stability concept developed for cartel analysis by
d’Aspremont et al. (1983), introduced into the literature on IEAs by Hoel (1992), Carraro
& Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994). This concept requires that a signatory does not
have an incentive to leave the agreement (internal stability) and that a non-signatory does
not have an incentive to join the agreement (external stability). This paper differs from the
standard literature in two respects. Firstly, the choice to become a member of the coalition
is not a one-shot decision but may change over time. Since the stock of pollutants changes
over time, the incentives to join or to leave the agreement may change as well and therefore
it may happen that countries join or leave the agreement at a later time. Secondly, in order
to increase the possible spectrum of stable coalition sizes an extra positive externality for
members is introduced. The standard model only allows for very small coalition sizes,
which implies that a dynamic analysis cannot show much variation either. Therefore it is
assumed that signatories can share R&D costs for the development of technology that is
needed to lower emission levels. This will increase the incentives to join the coalition, so
that a wider range of stable coalitions becomes feasible (see Buchner & Carraro 2005, and
Ruis & de Zeeuw 2010).
Rubio & Ulph (2007) is one of the few papers in which a model is developed where
membership of an IEA changes with the level of the stock but that model differs in two
respects. Firstly, the basic model is different and leads, for example, to non-signatories
emitting some maximum level of emissions. Secondly, when the size of the stable coalition
is determined at a later time, membership is randomly assigned so that all the countries
have the same expected present value of future net beneﬁts. In our paper the basic model
is standard and membership is not randomly assigned. We focus in that context on the
question how the size of the stable coalition changes with changes in the stock of pollutants
and how technology choice affects the results. First we show for average levels of R&D
and technology that the size of the stable coalition decreases if the stock of pollutants in-
creases. This implies that the countries should not wait too long with negotiations, not only
because the stock of pollutants becomes high but also because they lose opportunities for
cooperation. Next we show what happens for high levels of R&D with high effectiveness
of abatement and for low levels of R&D with low effectiveness of abatement, respectively.
In these cases we assume that the countries do not take account of possible changes in the
size of the coalition in the future but we will show that if such an agreement is regularly
renegotiated, the size will actually change. More speciﬁcally, if R&D levels for clean tech-
nology are low so that the effectiveness of abatement is low as well, the size of the stable
coalition will decrease over time and the steady-state stock of pollutants will be high. On
the other hand, if R&D levels are high so that the effectiveness of abatement is high as well,
the grand coalition can eventually be sustained: for a high initial stock of pollutants, the
2size of the stable coalition will increase over time and the stock of pollutants will decrease
and converge to a low steady state. It is left for further research to consider what happens
if the countries take account of expected future changes in the size of the stable coalition.
Besides the contribution to the analysis of IEAs, this paper also provides an exten-
sion to the theory of differential games. The countries are assumed to be symmetric but
asymmetries arise due to the choice to become a signatory or a non-signatory. If this is
a once-and-for-all decision, the resulting differential game is still standard (see Rubio &
Casino 2005). However, in this paper the asymmetries may change over time and such a
differential game has, to our knowledge, not been considered before.
Section 2 presents the basic pollution control model. In section 3 the value functions of
signatories and non-signatories are derived for a ﬁxed coalition size. In section 4 the size
of the stable coalition is given as a function of the stock of pollutants and this result is used
to discuss what happens if the agreement is regularly renegotiated. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 The model
There are n countries, n > 2. Without concern for the environment, each country will
emit a level E of pollutants and we assume that this level is constant over time. These
pollutants are added to a global stock of pollutants s that decays at a rate . This stock
of pollutants is damaging and we assume that damage costs are given by the quadratic
form 1
2s2. Countries can choose to become a member of the coalition or to stay out. The
size of the coalition is denoted by k and the number of outsiders by ` = n   k. Each
outsider j can reduce emissions down to E   aj(t), where the parameter  denotes the
effectiveness of abatement a at time t. The coalition can reduce emissions down to kE  
ka0(t) where a0 denotes the abatement level the coalition agrees upon for each member.
We assume that abatement costs are given by the quadratic form 1
2a2. The total costs can
simply be written as the sum of these quadratic forms by choosing the appropriate scale
for abatement a: the scale parameter can be incorporated into the parameter . Finally,
the effectiveness of abatement is related to the choice of technology. This technology has
to be developed at a ﬁxed cost c. We assume that the coalition members can share this
cost to reﬂect the positive externalities of R&D among cooperating countries. We do not
postulate a functional relationship between c and  but we will consider cases where both
c and  are either high or low or have intermediate values. The total costs of the coalition
are denoted by kC0, where C0 are the total costs of an individual coalition member, and the
total costs of outsider j are denoted by Cj. The discount rate is denoted by . This leads to
the following model: the coalition of size k minimises the costs of each individual coalition



























e t dt; j = 1;2; ;`: (2)
3subject to the dynamics of the stock of pollutants, given as
_ s(t) = nE   s(t)   ka0(t)  
` X
j=1
aj(t); s(0) = s0: (3)
The model (1)-(3) is a differential game (Bas ¸ar & Olsder 1982) with the coalition of size
k and the ` outsiders as ` + 1 players. We assume that countries can monitor the stock of
pollutants s and can therefore condition their abatement levels a at time t on the current
level of that stock. This implies that we focus on Nash equilibria in feedback strategies
a(s).
3 Fixed coalition size
We start with solving the model of the previous section for a ﬁxed coalition size k.
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A; i = 1;2; ;`:
(5)
Minimising these functions over a0 and ai respectively yields a0 = kp0 and ai = pi
for i = 1; ;`.
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The strategies a0 = kp0 and ai = pi, being feedback strategies, depend on the state s
1Also called pre-Hamilton functions or Hamilton functions.
4and therefore the system of state and co-state equations is given as
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_ pi(t) = pi(t)
0
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A   s(t); i = 1;2; ;`:
(10)
We restrict ourselves to the symmetric case in which all outsiders use the same abatement
strategy a1 = p1 and we restrict ourselves to linear strategies, given by
a0(s) = kp0(s) = k(p00 + p01s); a1(s) = p1(s) = (p10 + p11s): (11)
Note that we abuse notation slightly by denoting both the time-varying co-state variables
pi(t) as well as their state-dependent counterparts pi(s) with the same letter p.
The state dynamics (3) take the form
_ s(t) = nE   s(t)   2(kp00 + `p10)   2(kp01 + `p11)s(t); s(0) = s0: (12)
Note that
_ pi(t) = p0
i(s(t))_ s(t) = pi1_ s(t); i = 0;1: (13)
Substituting (12) in (13) and the result together with the deﬁnitions (11) in equations (9)
and (10) leads to two linear equations in s(t) that have to hold everywhere. This, in turn,
leads to a system of equations in the coefﬁcients pij, i;j = 0;1. The resulting expressions
are complex and we do not give them explicitly. 2
Because we restricted ourselves to linear strategies, the cost functions are quadratic.
The cost functions for the coalition and for an outsider are respectively denoted by C0(k;s)
and C1(k;s), where k denotes the size of the coalition. Because dC=ds = p, the coefﬁ-
cients pi1, i = 0;1, are the coefﬁcients of the quadratic terms in the value functions and
must therefore be positive in this case of cost minimisation. It follows from the state dy-
namics (12) that the state converges to a unique equilibrium
 s(k) =
nE   2(kp00 + `p10)
 + 2(kp01 + `p11)
: (14)
The cost functions (or value functions) can be computed by ﬁrst determining Ci(k;  s),
i = 0;1, and then setting
Ci(k;s) = Ci(k;  s) +
Z s
 s
pi(~ s)d~ s; i = 0;1: (15)
2These expressions are available from the authors upon request.
54 Stability
The largest coalition that satisﬁes internal and external stability (at initial state s0 and after
a once-and-for-all decision on membership) is found by starting at k = n and lowering k
step by step until for some k > 1
C0(k;s0) < C1(k   1;s0); (16)
if such a k exists. In this case the costs of a member of a coalition of size k are smaller than
the costs of an outsider to a coalition of size k   1, so that it does not pay for a coalition
member to choose to be an outsider.
If the costs of developing a new technology c are equal to 0, we are back in the well-
known case (see Rubio & Casino 2005) and the size of the stable coalition is small and
equal to 2 for this speciﬁc model. However, if these costs are positive so that membership
of the coalition is more beneﬁcial in the sense that these R&D costs can be shared, a whole
spectrum of stable sizes becomes possible. We present three interesting cases for different
sets of parameter values.
Consider ﬁrst the parameter values: n = 5, E = 5,  = 0,  = 0:004, c = 20000
and  = 0:03. This means that the number of (blocks of) countries negotiating is equal
to 5, business-as-usual emission levels are equal to 5, natural decay is 0, the effectiveness
of abatement is 0:004, R&D costs are equal to 20000, and the discount rate is 0:03. The
result is calculated with the help of Mathematica3 and is depicted in Figure 1(a). Note
that the state dynamics (12) depend on the size of the coalition: the dotted lines plot the
right-hand side of the state dynamics (12) as a function of s for each size of the coalition
k = 1;2;::;5. The intersection points with the s-axis are the steady-states  s(k), and the
lowest line corresponds to the dynamics in case of the grand coalition k = 5. The thick
lines denote the dynamics for the largest stable coalition when we start in that region of s.
For small values of s, the grand coalition is stable; it loses stability at s  390. Between
s  390 and s  605, the coalition of size 4 is stable and for larger starting values of s, the
coalition of size 3 is stable. Total costs are determined as the sum of all value functions.
Figure 1(b) depicts the total costs. At the values s  390 and s  605, the costs jump up
because the size of the stable coalition decreases.
This result has interesting implications. It follows that if the stock of pollutants has
risen above a jump point before environmental concerns are taken seriously, costs not only
become higher because the stock is high but also because a large stable coalition cannot be
sustained anymore. Furthermore, the steady-state of the stock will be higher than in case
the agreement had been implemented before the stock passed the jump point. It follows
that it matters to act quickly, not only because the stock of pollutants is still low but also
because it is easier to establish cooperation.
In Figure 1(a) the state remains in the region where it starts and therefore the size of
the largest stable coalition does not change when the state converges to the steady state.
However, this is not necessarily the case for all parameter settings. Consider the same
parameter set as above but change the parameters (;c) ﬁrst to (0:002;5000) and then
to (0:01;40000). In the ﬁrst case the countries invest in a cheaper and less effective techno-
logy than before, and in the second case the countries invest in a more expensive and more
effective technology. The results are depicted in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.


































































Figure 3: Expensive and effective technology
7In these cases the size of the largest stable coalition may change when the state con-
verges to the steady state. In the ﬁrst case, when we start at a very low stock, the size of
the largest stable coalition is 5 but this size changes to 4 and then to 3 before the state has
reached the steady state that results for a coalition of size 5. Similarly, when we start in
the region where the size of the largest stable coalition is 3, this size changes to 2 before
the state has reached the steady state. This implies that the size of the stable coalition will
change if the agreement is renegotiated after these incentives have changed. In the second
case, it is the other way around. When we start at a very high stock, the size of the largest
stable coalition is 3 but this size increases to 4 and then to 5 before the state has reached
the steady state that results for a coalition of size 3. The implications are the same as in the
ﬁrst case.
It follows that if the decision on membership is not taken once and for all, the size of the
stable coalition may change with changes in the stock of pollutants. In the two cases above
it is shown that if an International Environmental Agreement is regularly renegotiated, the
size of the stable coalition will not stay the same. It is clear that if R&D costs are low,
the extra incentive to join the coalition is low as well so that it will be harder to sustain
a large stable coalition. Furthermore, it is clear that low effectiveness of abatement will
lead to a high stock of pollutants. Similarly, high R&D costs and a high effectiveness of
abatement have the opposite effects. It is remarkable, however, that the size of the stable
coalition changes over time. In the ﬁrst case, if we start at a very low stock of pollutants, the
countries will ﬁrst coordinate on the grand coalition but this coalition loses stability quickly.
When the agreement is renegotiated, the size of the coalition decreases step by step until
the size is only 2, and the stock of pollutants converges to a very high steady state. In the
second case, the opposite occurs. If we start at a very high stock of pollutants, the size of
the stable coalition is only 3 initially but it increases step by step until the grand coalition
is reached, and the stock of pollutants converges to a very low steady state. Since these two
cases only differ in technology choice, it follows that this matters a lot. In case of a cheap
and ineffective technology, a large stable coalition cannot be sustained and the steady-state
stock of pollutants is very high. In case of an expensive and effective technology, however,
the grand coalition is stable or becomes stable over time, and the steady-state stock of
pollutants is very low.
The model is vulnerable for an important type of critique: the countries are not forward
looking with respect to the size of the stable coalition. Although the International Environ-
mental Agreement is regularly renegotiated, it is assumed that the decision of the countries
to join the coalition or not is not based on expected changes in the size of the stable coali-
tion. It is left for further research to show what happens if the countries are also forward
looking in this respect.
5 Conclusion
This paper connects the size of a stable International Environmental Agreement to the level
of the stock of pollutants. The spectrum of stable coalition sizes is increased by introducing
an extra positive externality of shared R&D costs within the agreement. First it is shown for
average levels of R&D costs that the size of the stable coalition decreases with an increasing
level of the stock of pollutants. It pays to implement an agreement early, not only because
8the stock of pollutants is still low but also because a large stable coalition is still possible.
Next it is shown that in case of high and low levels of R&D costs, respectively, the size
of the stable coalition may change over time if the agreement is regularly renegotiated.
For a cheap and ineffective technology, a large stable coalition cannot be sustained and
the steady-state stock of pollutants is very high. For an expensive and effective technology,
however, the grand coalition is stable or becomes stable over time and the steady-state stock
of pollutants is very low.
Further research will focus on three reﬁnements of the model. First, we want to in-
corporate technology choice as one of the decision stages in the model. Second, we want
to consider the time-inconsistency in the model and investigate what happens if countries
incorporate the changes in the size of the coalition that are to be expected. Third, we want
to consider non-linear dynamics with tipping points as this describes the most important
environmental problems of our time such as climate change.
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